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Abstract
This paper presents an overlapping generations model where pollution,
private and public healths are all determinants of longevity. Public ex-
penditure, financed through labour taxation, provide both public health
and abatement. We study the complementarity between the three compo-
nents of longevity on welfare and economic stability. At the steady state,
we show that an appropriate fiscal policy may enhance welfare. However,
when pollution is heavily harmful for longevity, the economy might ex-
perience aggregate instability or endogenous cycles. Nonetheless, a fiscal
policy, which raises the share of public spending devoted to health, may
display stabilizing virtues and rule out cycles. This allows us to recom-
mend the design of the public policy that may comply with the dynamic
and welfare objectives.
JEL classification: J10; O40; Q56; C62.
Keywords: Longevity; Pollution; Welfare; Complex dynamics.
1 Introduction
Data on life expectancy and the causes of death are often seen as a relevant
basis for assessing agents’ health status and adjusting public policies. Since the
mid-twentieth century, the health status of individuals has greatly improved in
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the world and thus, life expectancy has considerably grown1. These longevity
gains are mainly due to substantial progress that has been made in reducing
mortality due to infectious diseases, improving sources of drinking-water and
basic sanitation while significant advances has been achieved in medicine and
access to healthcare (WHO (2014)). The economic literature has been very pro-
lific with regards to the contribution of health, in particular through longevity,
in the development process (Mirowsky and Ross (1998), Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Chakraborty (2004), Cervelatti and Sunde (2005), Chakraborty and Das
(2005)). In richer economies, individuals may afford medical care and medicines,
they are often more educated and thus adopt healthier lifestyles meanwhile pub-
lic authorities are capable of funding more public health services and developing
access to public health systems. Healthier agents are more productive and in-
vest more, growth is promoted and, in turn, the enhanced development drives
improvements in health status.
This virtuous cycle might however be put at risk as the development process
has came along with negative externalities like pollution and environmental
deterioration. In fact, regarding recent striking and acute episodes of urban
air pollution, the World Health Organization (WHO (2009)) has listed among
the leading global risks for health and mortality, pollution and environmental
deterioration (outdoor air pollution, indoor air pollution, unsafe water etc). Say
otherwise, worldwide health risks are in transition: While population is globally
ageing, owing to successes against infectious diseases, people face nowadays new
burdens of chronic and acute diseases, and environmental factors are a big part
of these ”modern” risks. Even more, in 2014 during the WHO’s annual assembly
that held in Geneva, new estimates were released to confirm that air pollution is
now the world’s largest single environmental health risk. According to WHO, in
2012, at a global scale, around 7 millions people died as a result of air exposure.
In addition, 8% of lung cancer deaths should be attributable to deteriorated
environmental conditions. Similarly, unsafe water might be responsible for 88%
of diarrhoeal deaths. Then, it becomes vital to clearly evaluate and understand
the role of these health risks to prevent from a possible economic contraction or
to fight against their negative effects on longevity and welfare.
While both pollution and health status became key determinants of house-
holds longevity, they of course display opposite effects. In addition, they differ
along, at least, one dimension. Individuals have a negligible influence on global
pollution, especially at a macroeconomic level where pollutants can be seen as
non-local ones. Moreover, global costs of abating pollution or preserving en-
vironmental conditions are often disproportionate with regards to individuals
capacity to afford them. Then, it seems that those actions are mainly under-
taken by public authorities. As for health, the argument is more disputable.
Even if governments remain main contributors to world health spending, indi-
viduals can invest in their own health capital. For instance, such efforts include
annual health screening, adoption of healthy life styles, but also out-of-pocket
1Even though some disparities remain among genders or/and developed and developing
countries, we can observe both a convergence in life expectancy and a reduction in the cross-
country dispersion of longevity (see Becker et al. (2003)).
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expenses for essential medication and private health services. Finally, we ar-
gue that all these three components are complement inputs in the production
of health status as private health efforts may induce larger improvements in
life expectancy when they come along with public efforts to maintain a good
environmental quality and to provide efficient public health care systems.
The goal of the paper is to show that the aforementioned interactions deeply
affect the dynamic behavior of the economy. In particular, we assess whether
the noxious impact of pollution on longevity might challenge the well-known
two-way causality established between health and economic development in the
long term. We show that these complement variables (private and public health
and pollution) might indeed lead to irreversibility to the extent that they might
prevent one economy to experience a stable and sustainable growth path. For-
mally, we emphasize the destabilising role of pollution on the dynamic behavior
of the economy and underscore the occurrence of structural instability as well
as endogenous cycles. These results call for a deeper exploration of what should
be an appropriate public policy in order to maintain the development process
or/and to restore the stability property of the dynamic behavior of the economy.
As evoked previously, two types of actions can be undertaken to sustain a good
health status: On the one hand, public authorities may reduce harmful pollu-
tion flows; On the other hand, they could provide health protection services or
improve preventive health programmes. We argue that a well-designed public
policy may exhibit both stabilizing virtues and improve the long-run welfare of
economic agents.
To do so, we consider an overlapping generations model with production
and endogenous longevity. Each young agent works for a competitive wage
and survives to the start of the old age. Nevertheless, she is alive only for a
fraction of the second period of life and only cares about their second period
consumption while alive. In order to extend her time length, she may incur
investment in her own health, by comparing the marginal benefit of investing in
health with its opportunity cost, that is a reduction of savings. In addition, her
life expectancy is positively influenced by public health expenditure while it is
negatively impacted by the deterioration of the environment. Through labour
income taxation, the government does not only provide health expenditure, but
also pollution abatement. The latter expenses reduce the pollution stock that
would otherwise raise with aggregate production. No matter the level of the tax
rate, the fiscal policy consists in setting the sharing rule of public funds, that is
the share devoted to public health (and respectively abatement).
In this framework, there exists a unique steady state. Taking the sharing
rule as a policy parameter, we argue that it displays two opposite effects on
longevity, and therefore, on capital accumulation and welfare. On the one hand,
increasing the amount of public health care raises longevity. On the other
hand, it generates a harmful feedback effect as abatement is cut down. We
show that when pollution weakly affects longevity and/or the share of public
expenditure devoted to public health is low, the first effect dominates, whereas
when pollution becomes a crucial determinant of longevity and/or the public
policy more favorable towards public health, the second effect dominates. The
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optimal policy design in a second best framework is even precisely featured in
the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
The complementarity between health and pollution has also strong implica-
tions on the dynamic path of physical capital accumulation and stability proper-
ties of the economy. Indeed, when the pollution effect on longevity is negligible,
the steady state is stable, with monotonic convergence. However, it looses its
stability when pollution becomes heavily damaging. Then, the sustainability of
the development process is reconsidered as the economy experiences aggregate
instability. This shift in the stability property occurs through the occurrence
of endogenous cycles (Hopf bifurcation). These fluctuations are explained by
the increasing weight of pollution and the complementary it induces. Indeed, a
growing sequence of physical capital implies more public health expenses, but
also more pollution. When pollution is significantly detrimental to longevity,
the latter may decrease, pushing down the saving rate. Therefore, capital accu-
mulation slows down, entailing a reversal of the dynamic path.
This asks for evaluating the role played by the public policy. In fact, a
policy designed by a larger support towards public health might be stabilizing,
by reducing the range of parameters for instability. However, before making
any policy recommendation, one should also take care of the outcome of such
a policy on the stationary welfare. Indeed, from our previous analysis, we have
stated that such a policy might be welfare damaging when the initial support
to public health is already large. In contrast, this is no longer the case when
initially public funds are mainly devoted to abatement. In this last case, the
two objectives of stabilisation and welfare maximisation may be reconciled.
Following Chakraborty (2004) who introduces a survival probability to old
age that depends on public health expenditure only, several papers have en-
dogenised mortality in overlapping generations growth models. For instance,
Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) consider that both private and public expendi-
ture define the longevity, while in Jouvet et al. (2010), longevity raises with
private health investment, but suffers from pollution. Finally, several recent pa-
pers rather consider that the survival probability depends on public health and
pollution (see for instance Pautrel (2008, 2009), Varvarigos (2010), Palivos and
Varvarigos (2014) and Raffin and Seegmuller (2014)). We make a bridge between
these different specifications assuming that longevity depends on pollution, pri-
vate and public health. However, Palivos and Varvarigos (2014) is surely the
contribution closest related to ours. Considering a framework with learning-by-
doing productive externalities, they show that the economy may asymptotically
converge to the long run growth rate only if pollution abatement provided by
the government is substantial. Otherwise, the economy experiences endogenous
cycles. Our results and methodology are for all that quite different. In contrast
to them, we show that reducing the public effort of abatement can stabilize the
economy and we rather highlight the destabilizing role of pollution on the devel-
opment pattern of the economy. In their framework, the pollution externality
is not per se the source of endogenous fluctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we define an intertemporal equilibrium and show the existence and
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uniqueness of the steady state. We analyse the effects of the public policy on
the steady state in Section 4. In Section 5, we explore the dynamic properties
of our framework. The stabilizing role of the policy is discussed in Section 6 and
finally, Section 7 concludes. Many technical details are relegated to Appendices.
2 The model
2.1 Households
We consider an overlapping generations model, where time is discrete, t =
0, 1, ...,∞ and the population size of a young generation is constant and nor-
malized to unity. When young, the representative agent lives during the whole
period. However, she may survive to old age with a probability pit ∈ [0, 1).
When old, agents consume an amount ct+1 at each moment of time. Since the
focus of our attention is on the links between pollution and life expectancy,
we voluntary choose to abstract from consumption choices in the first period
of time. Consequently, preferences of an individual born at date t are defined
over the second period consumption and are represented by the following utility
function:
Ut = pitu(ct+1) (1)
In our framework, longevity is endogenous but even crucially depends on a
health indicator denoted by θt. For tractability reasons, let us consider the
following explicit function for life expectancy that satisfies usual properties
(see for instance Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Cervelatti and Sunde (2003),
Chakraborty (2004), Castello´-Climent and Dome´nech (2008) or Palivos and Var-
varigos (2014)):
pit ≡ pi(θt) = bθt
1 + θt
, (2)
with 0 < b < 1. Therefore, pi(θt) is increasing from pi(0) = 0 to pi(+∞) = b and
is strictly concave with θt.
When young, agents are endowed with one unit of labour, which they supply
inelastically to firms. They may also influence their life expectancy by investing
in their own health. Typically, these expenditure (xt) encompass all out-of-
pocket expenses for basic medication or clinical services provided by private
practitioners or the cost of buying nutrients, organic food and the like. Alterna-
tively, they may use their labour income (wt) for savings (st) in order to ensure
consumption streams when old2 . Moreover, a tax τ ∈ [0, 1) is levied on their
revenue in order to finance any kinds of public expenditure. Thus, the first
period budget constraint is written as:
xt + st = (1− τ)wt (3)
2Notice that in our set-up, we only focus on the link between pollution and mortality rather
than morbidity. The deterioration of health status and the induced loss of productivity has
already been explored in papers like Williams (2002, 2003) or Raffin (2012).
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During their second period of life, agents retire and they only consume their
remunerated savings3:
Rt+1st = ct+1pit, (4)
where Rt+1 denotes the interest rate under complete capital depreciation. No-
tice that, following Chakraborty (2004), we assume a perfect annuity market,
meaning that the return of total savings of young agents is distributed among
all survival old households.4
In addition and beyond the sole private health spending, we argue that
longevity may also be shaped by publicly funded health services (denoted by
ηt), which obviously enhance the health status, while the latter decline through
the harmful effects of the pollution stock, Pt.
5 Accordingly, let us express the
health indicator as:
θt =
xαt η
1−α
t
P βt
(5)
with 0 6 α 6 1 and β > 0. As in Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), this equation
captures the possible interactions between public and private components in
the health sector, i.e. their complementarity. In particular, public health care
programs such as provision of clinical facilities, hospitals, sanitation or disease-
control measures increase the productivity of private health investments rather
than replace them. The parameter α accounts for the share of private health
investments in total health expenditure: The higher α, the more sensitive is the
health indicator to private investments relative to public ones. But in contrast
to Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007), we introduce an additional element which is
the pollution stock that comes to reduce the efficiency of both types of health
spending, as soon as β > 0.
Finally, in order to perform a clear and relevant analysis, we consider the
following explicit instantaneous CRRA utility function:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ (6)
with 0 < σ < 1 the degree of concavity of u(c), which ensures that utility is
increasing with life expectancy. Pollution and public health care being given,
individuals maximize the utility function (1) substituting (2), (5) and (6), facing
the two budget constraints (3) and (4), and xt > 0. The first order condition
(FOC) yields:
1
1 + θt
α
xt
≤ 1− σ
σst
(7)
3So far we do not consider that agents may influence their longevity when old, through
curative treatment for instance. We only consider life expectancy at birth, so that longevity
depends on the living conditions experienced during young age.
4Following this hypothesis, pit can alternatively be interpreted as longevity or life ex-
pectancy.
5Notice that in our set-up, we only focus on the link between pollution and mortality rather
than morbidity. The deterioration of health status and the induced loss of productivity has
already been explored in papers like Williams (2002, 2003) or Raffin (2012).
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with equality if xt > 0.
6 This equation reflects the trade-off agents face to
when choosing the amount of private health spending. On the one hand, they
invest in their own health in order to live longer and to increase their utility;
On the other hand, these expenses reduce the revenue to be saved for future
consumption and thus lower future utility. Consequently, economic growth and
longevity compete to the extent that investing in private health diverts away
resources from good production, despite the fact that it extends the length of
time. A deeper analysis of equation (7) allows us to state that there is no
equilibrium without private health expenditure7:
Lemma 1 Agents always invest a strictly positive amount of their income in
private health expenditure, so that xt > 0 ∀t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (7) that holds with an equality captures the arbitrage between
investing in capital (st) and private health (xt). On one side, because we have
assumed a perfect annuity market, the marginal return of capital, Rt+1u
′(ct+1),
is independent of agents’ health status, θt. On the other side, the marginal
return of private health, (∂pit/∂xt)σu(ct+1), positively depends on the induced
marginal longevity gain. Due to the concavity property of pit, the return on
health investment is thus lower when the health status is already high. In that
case, agents are less likely to spend in private health and this triggers more
savings.
Obviously, a direct effect of a larger value of the parameter α is a real-
location of resources towards health, which is detrimental to physical capital
accumulation.
2.2 Public sector
As mentioned previously, public authorities intervene in the economy through
the provision of two types of public services: First, the government provides
public health expenditure (ηt); Second, she may also engage in environmental
protection actions (Gt) in order to reduce harmful effects of pollution on health.
We consider that due to the extensively large costs associated with pollution
abatement, only the government may afford them. Since both expenditure are
6Let us note that the second order condition (SOC) is also satisfied. Indeed, the FOC can
be rewritten:
∂pit
∂xt
σu(ct+1)−Rt+1u′(ct+1) 6 0
We deduce that the SOC is given by:
∂2pit
∂x2t
σu(ct+1)−
(
Rt+1
pit
+
ct+1
pit
∂pit
∂xt
)[
∂pit
∂xt
σu′(ct+1)−Rt+1u′′(ct+1)
]
< 0
7Note that Lemma 1 holds even if we consider a CES function over private and public
health. Therefore, even though public and private health expenses are not necessary to have
a positive longevity, agents always invest in private health.
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financed thanks to labour income taxation, they can be expressed as:
ηt = µτwt (8)
Gt = (1− µ)τwt (9)
where µ ∈ (0, 1] accounts for the time invariant design of the public policy
(or sharing rule), that is the share of public revenue devoted to public health
spending8. Hence, any increase in µ reduces just as much the effort of public
abatement.
2.3 Pollution
In our set-up, what matters as a key determinant of life expectancy is the stock
of pollution, rather than the flow of polluting emissions. Hence, we need to
describe the dynamic evolution of this variable to account for the deterioration
of the environmental quality over time. As standard in the literature (see for
instance John and Pecchenino (1994), Withagen (1995), Jouvet et al. (2005)),
the pollution stock evolves according to the following law of motion:
Pt+1 = (1−m)Pt + 1Yt − 2Gt (10)
with m ∈ (0, 1), 1 > 0, 2 > 0, and P0 > 0 given. In other words, environ-
mental quality is damaged by streams of pollution induced by the production
process but may be enhanced thanks to public spending. As for the parame-
ter m, it captures ecological inertia phenomena, since nature can not entirely
absorb pollution flows at each period of time. Finally, parameters 1 and 2
reflect the dirtiness degree of production and the efficiency of public abatement,
respectively.
2.4 Production
There is a unique final good that is produced by a continuum of unit size of
competitive firms using the neo-classical technology Yt = F (Kt, Lt), where Yt
is aggregate production, Kt aggregate capital and Lt aggregate labour. The
production function displays usual properties and is homogeneous of degree 1.
Let kt ≡ Kt/Lt denote the capital per young household and f(kt) ≡ F (kt, 1)
the intensive form of the production function. In order to lead a proper analysis
of the equilibrium and the dynamics of the economy, we assume the following:
Assumption 1 f (k) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞) and C2 on
(0,+∞), strictly increasing (f ′ (k) > 0) and strictly concave (f ′′ (k) < 0).
There exists k˜ > 0 such that f(k˜)/k˜ − f ′(k˜) >
(
1 + α σ1−σ
)
/(1 − τ). Defin-
ing s(k) ≡ f ′(k)k/f(k) ∈ (0, 1) as the capital share in total income and ρ(k) ≡
[f ′ (k) k/f (k)− 1] f ′ (k) / [kf ′′ (k)] > 0 as the elasticity of capital-labour substi-
tution, we further assume ρ(k) > max{2s(k); 1− s(k)} and s(k) < 1/2.
8Note that we assume µ 6= 0 to exclude a zero utility coming from a nil longevity.
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Profit maximization yields:
wt = f(kt)− ktf ′(kt) ≡ w(kt) (11)
Rt = f
′(kt) ≡ R(kt) (12)
We can easily deduce that w′(k)k/w(k) = s(k)/ρ(k) and R′(k)k/R(k) = −(1−
s(k))/ρ(k).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Intertemporal equilibrium
Being given that the size of a young working generation equals one, the equi-
librium in the labour market is ensured by Lt = 1. In addition, capital mar-
ket clears, which requires that aggregate investment equals aggregate savings:
kt+1 = st. From the budget constraint (3), this directly implies that xt =
(1− τ)w(kt)−kt+1. Moreover, using (11), we can express the equilibrium levels
of public services as:
ηt = µτw(kt) (13)
Gt = (1− µ)τw(kt) (14)
Substituting (11) and (14) into equation (10), we obtain:
Pt+1 = (1−m)Pt + 1f(kt)− 2(1− µ)τw(kt) (15)
Then, we can rewrite equation (7) with equality as:
kt+1 =
1 + θt
1 + α σ1−σ + θt
(1− τ)w(kt) (16)
with
θt =
[(1− τ)w(kt)− kt+1]α[µτw(kt)]1−α
P βt
(17)
Given k0 > 0 and P0 > 0, equations (15)-(17) define the dynamics of the
economy through the evolution of the sequence (kt, Pt), for all t > 0.
Before going further and derive our main results and in order to stick with
reality, let us assume the following parametric hypothesis:
Assumption 2 1 > 2
Assumption 2 is not so much restrictive as it means that pollution flows
exceed abatement flows, reflecting what can be observed in real world. It also
implies that the available technology of abatement is not so much efficient with
respect to the emission rate of pollution per unit of production. Again, this
seems to be consistent with empirical evidences.
9
Given the dynamic system (15)-(17), we can identify several mechanisms
crucial to our analysis and our understanding of the dynamic behavior of the
economy. At this stage, we have already underscored the endogenous character
of the saving rate 1+θt1+α σ1−σ+θt
(see equation (16)). In particular, despite the
a priori complementarity between private and public health expenditure, we
have explained that a enhanced health indicator lowers the marginal return on
private health spending, but in turn, fosters capital accumulation.
Then, we can emphasize two complementary components that also affect
longevity and which are taken as given by households. Indeed, public health
expenditure positively influence longevity, whereas pollution entails a negative
externality. These two complementary components are mainly driven by the
government behavior, that is the allocation of her resources between health care
and pollution abatement. These two policies are targeted to reach a unique
goal, which is a lengthening of lifetime. Nevertheless, note that the sequence of
outcome is not simultaneous: A larger amount of health expenditure involves a
longer life expectancy of the current generation while a more substantial effort
of abatement displays its positive consequences for the next generation only.
We turn now to the analysis of the existence and uniqueness of the stationary
equilibrium.
3.2 Stationary equilibrium
Using (15)-(17), a steady state is defined by kt = kt+1 = k and Pt = Pt+1 = P ,
for all t, satisfying:
P =
[(1− τ)w(k)− k]α+1β [µτw(k)] 1−αβ[(
α σ1−σ + 1
)
k − (1− τ)w(k)
] 1
β
≡ ϕ(k) (18)
P =
1
m
[1f(k)− 2(1− µ)τw(k)] ≡ ψ(k) (19)
Using these two equations, we can demonstrate the existence and the unique-
ness of the stationary solution (k∗, P ∗).
Proposition 1 Let k and k be defined by:
k = (1− τ)w(k) (20)
k =
(1− τ)w(k)
1 + α σ1−σ
(21)
Under Assumptions 1-2, there exists a unique steady state k∗ > 0 that belongs
to (k, k]. This implies that there exists a unique value P ∗ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The stationary solution eventually reached by one economy crucially depends
on the public policy implemented by the government. We tackle this issue in
the following.
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4 May public policy be welfare improving?
In this section, we study the consequences associated with a change in the
policy design, that is a larger share of public revenue devoted to public health.
In particular, we investigate whether such a policy may improve welfare W ∗ or
not in the long term. Let us first define the stationary welfare as follows:
W ≡ pi(θ) c
1−σ
1− σ (22)
As a preliminary result, we can show that the welfare at the steady state can
be defined as an increasing function of physical capital only:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-2, the welfare evaluated at the steady state
W ∗ is an increasing function of capital, i.e. W ∗ ≡W (k∗) with W ′(k∗) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Indeed, using (1), (4) and (6), we can observe that utility is increasing with
respect to longevity and remunerated savings. The last one increases with re-
spect to capital. Using (16), we also deduce that the indicator of health depends
positively on the stock of physical capital at the steady state. This implies that
the richer the economy, the better the health status, despite the level of pollu-
tion. In other words, the increasing expenditure in private and public health
always offset the damaging effect of a growing stock of pollution. This explains
that welfare raises with capital accumulation.
The design of the public policy may explain why one economy reaches a
steady state with larger levels of capital, pollution and/or welfare compared to
another one. We study now more carefully the outcome induced by a change
in the public policy design, that is a raise in µ, on these stationary levels of
capital, welfare and pollution:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-2, a change in the policy design in favor
of a larger support to public health care, i.e. a larger µ, displays the following
effects:
1. k∗ and W ∗ are increasing in µ if and only if (1 − α)[1f(k∗) − 2(1 −
µ)τw(k∗)] > β2µτw(k∗), which is satisfied for 1− α > β 2µτ1−2(1−µ)τ ;
2. k∗ and W ∗ are decreasing in µ if and only if (1 − α)[1f(k∗) − 2(1 −
µ)τw(k∗)] < β2µτw(k∗), which is satisfied for 1− α < β 2µτ21 ;
In addition, pollution P ∗ is always increasing in µ.
Proof. See Appendix D.
When dealing with pollution, the raising share of public revenue devoted
to public health is detrimental to the effort of public abatement and yields a
clear-cut outcome: Pollution always raises. As for the welfare per se or the
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stock of capital, conclusions are more ambiguous. They even depend on both
the initial sharing of public receipts, the level of the tax and the stationary stock
of physical capital. This being so, we can claim that two economies that share
quite similar economic and technological features may nonetheless differ in the
long run due to the implemented public policy. According to Proposition 2, in
case 1, one economy that chooses to invest more in public health care should be
better off in the long term. Conversely, in the second case, one economy that
gives priority to environmental preservation should be wealthier. Why is it so?
The reasoning behind this result is presented below.
We have explained that capital accumulation accelerates when health status
(and longevity) enhances and that a larger value of µ triggers two opposite effects
on health characteristics: A positive one through a larger amount of public
health expenditure and a negative one because this simultaneously lowers public
environmental protection, which involves more pollution. Proposition 2 states
that the first (second) effect dominates when the weight of public health 1−α in
the health indicator is sufficiently large (low) relative to the weight of pollution
β. So, when public health is a major component of health status, the noxious
effect of a growing pollution stock is overweighted by a greater improvement
in health status. Overall, the welfare is enhanced at the steady state. On the
contrary, when the role played by health determinants is relatively minor, a
public policy in favor of health displays a stronger negative effect on the quality
of the environment, which annihilates its positive effect on life expectancy and
capital accumulation.
Beyond this statement, we may also emphasize the role played by the initial
public finances allocation. In particular, if the sharing rule is already beneficial
towards public health, then, configuration 2 is more likely. Hence, there is less
need of reinforcing it, otherwise it can be costly in terms of wealth accumulation
and welfare. Conversely, for a relatively low initial value of µ, configuration 1
is more likely. This might be explained thanks to the concavity property of the
longevity function with respect to the health indicator. A more generous allo-
cation of public funds towards health has a stronger positive effect on longevity
when it is low enough, thus promoting fast capital accumulation. On the con-
trary, the marginal gain of promoting public health in terms of longevity is
negligible when it is already high. But, the subsequent increase in pollution
(due to a shift in public fund allocation) is relatively more damaging, and this
might reduce lifetime length. Therefore, if the relationship between the capital
stock and the sharing rule of public funds seems to be non-monotonous, there
might be a room for determining the second best optimal policy that maximises
welfare at the steady state.
Having this in mind, we note that Proposition 2 gives necessary and sufficient
conditions as well as sufficient conditions to evaluate the consequences of a
change in µ on stationary capital and welfare. While the last ones do not depend
on the steady state k∗, the necessary and sufficient conditions do. Therefore, it
looks interesting to focus on the case of a Cobb-Douglas technology where more
clear-cut conclusions can be obtained.
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Corollary 1 Let
µ̂ ≡ (1− α)(1 − 2τ(1− s))
2τ(1− s)(β − (1− α)) (23)
Under Assumptions 1-2, assume further that f(k) ≡ Aks, with A > 0 and
0 < s < 1/2.
1. If β 6 (1 − α)1/[2τ(1 − s)], k∗ and W ∗ are increasing in µ for all
µ ∈ (0, 1].
2. If β > (1 − α)1/[2τ(1 − s)], k∗ and W ∗ are increasing in µ for all
µ ∈ (0, µ̂] and decreasing in µ for all µ ∈ [µ̂, 1].
Proof. See Appendix E.
The first result of this corollary confirms Proposition 2. When longevity
is barely sensitive to pollution compared to usual health components, a larger
share of public spending devoted to public health always induces a higher level
of capital and welfare, through its positive effect on longevity, which in turns
fosters savings. From a normative point of view, the optimal policy design boils
down to set µ = 1.
The second result is even more of interest. It clearly highlights the envisioned
inverse U-shaped relationship between the policy design µ and the economic
variables k∗ or W ∗. In a world of second best optimality, there exists a level
of public spending devoted to public health µˆ, as defined in Corollary 1, that
maximizes both the stationary welfare and level of physical capital. We argue
that this may still be justified by the two opposite effects induced by a shift
in the value of µ on the health status and therefore, on longevity, as described
above.
5 The destabilizing role of pollution
In this section, we analyse the convergence of the economy towards the pre-
viously identified steady state (see Proposition 1). We show that the comple-
mentarity between pollution and (public and private) health that characterizes
longevity may be a source of instability and endogenous cycles.
For ease of presentation, we establish that choosing an appropriate value of
m ∈ (0, 1) allows us to normalize the steady state k∗, such that k∗ = 1. Then,
we lead the analysis of the dynamics studying the stability properties of the
steady state.
Proposition 3 Let
1 ≡ [(1− τ)w(1)− 1]
α+1
β [µτw(1)]
1−α
β
f(1)
(
ασ
1−σ + 1
)1/β (24)
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Assuming that 1 < 1
9, 1 < (1−τ)w(1) < 1+α σ1−σ and Assumptions 1-2 hold,
there exists a unique m∗ ∈ (0, 1) that ensures that k∗ = 1 ∈ (k, k).
Proof. See Appendix F.
We deduce the level of pollution that comes along with the normalized steady
state k∗ = 1:
P ∗ =
[(1− τ)w − 1]α+1β [µτw] 1−αβ[
α σ1−σ + 1− (1− τ)w
] 1
β
, (25)
where we denote w ≡ w(1), meanwhile we define s ≡ s(1) and ρ ≡ ρ(1). To
analyse the stability properties of the steady state, we differentiate the dynamic
system (15)-(16) around the normalized steady state. We establish the following:
Lemma 3 Assuming that 1 < 1, 1 < (1− τ)w < 1 + α σ1−σ and Assumptions
1-2 hold, the characteristic polynomial evaluated at the steady state k∗ = 1 is
given by P (λ) = λ2 − T (ρ)λ+D(ρ) = 0, where:
T (ρ) = 1−m∗ + s
ρ
1 + (1−τ)w−(1−α)(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
(26)
D(ρ) = (1−m∗) s
ρ
1 + (1−τ)w−(1−α)(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
(27)
+ m∗
s
ρ
ρ1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
βθασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
and
θ =
ασ/(1− σ) + 1− (1− τ)w
(1− τ)w − 1 (28)
Proof. See Appendix G.
We now determine the stability properties of the steady state, i.e. whether
it is a saddle, a source or a sink. Since the two dynamic variables kt and Pt are
predetermined, the dynamic path locally converges to the steady state only if
it is a sink. We also focus on the existence of endogenous cycles studying the
occurrence of bifurcations. To simplify our proofs, we assume:
Assumption 3 s > 1/3.
This parametric assumption means that 2s > 1−s and according to Assumption
1, ρ ∈ (2s,+∞). Then, we can establish a first result on the stability properties
of the steady state:
9Of course, this last inequality may be compatible with Assumption 2.
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Lemma 4 Assuming that 1 < 1, 1 < (1− τ)w < 1 + α σ1−σ and Assumptions
1-3 hold, the steady state can never be a saddle. It is either a sink or a source.
Proof. See Appendix H.
This lemma shows that starting in a neighbourhood of the steady state, the
economy either converges to this equilibrium or there is instability. Choosing
the elasticity of capital-labour substitution ρ as a bifurcation parameter, we
clarify whenever one of these two configurations occurs. We discuss the results
according to the level of β, i.e. the weight of pollution in the health indicator.
Indeed, as mentioned in Introduction, the role played by environmental factors
in the worldwide evolution of life expectancy has sharply increased over the last
decades in comparison with usual health determinants. This phenomenon can
be formally captured by the parameter β and the different values it can takes.
A larger value of the parameter β means of course that the economy is more
vulnerable to environmental risks.
Proposition 4 Assuming that 1 < 1, 1 < (1− τ)w < 1 +α σ1−σ and Assump-
tions 1-3 hold, there exist Aβ > 0, 0 < Bβ < 1, Cβ > 0 and ∆β > 0, such
that:
1. If β is sufficiently low, satisfying β < min{1/Aβ ; (1−Bβ)/Cβ}, the steady
state is a sink for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞);
2. If µ < 1 − 1s/[2τ(1 − s)]10, α sufficiently low and β larger but close to
1/Aβ, there exists ρH ∈ (2s,+∞) such that the steady state is a sink for
ρ ∈ (2s, ρH), a Hopf bifurcation generically occurs for ρ = ρH , and the
steady state is a source for ρ ∈ (ρH ,+∞);
3. If µ is close to 1 and β smaller but close to 1/Aβ, there exists ρH ∈
(2s,+∞) such that the steady state is a source for ρ ∈ (2s, ρH), a Hopf
bifurcation generically occurs for ρ = ρH , and the steady state is a sink
for ρ ∈ (ρH ,+∞);
4. If β is sufficiently large, satisfying β > max{1/Aβ ; (1 − Bβ)/Cβ}, the
steady state is a source for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞).
In addition, when β < ∆β the eigenvalues are real, whereas when β > ∆β, the
eigenvalues are complex conjugates.
Proof. See Appendix I.
When pollution weakly affects longevity (β sufficiently low), the economy
converges to the steady state. If β is even lower than ∆β , the eigenvalues are
real and the convergence is monotonic. On the contrary, if β satisfies β > ∆β ,
one converges to the steady state through oscillations.
10Note that according to Assumptions 1-3, this inequality may be satisfied only if τ is
sufficiently large and 2 sufficiently close to 1, that is τ > 1s/[2(1− s)].
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On the contrary, when pollution is considered to be a driving factor of
longevity (β sufficiently large), the steady state turns out to be unstable. Of
course, according to our previous comment, if β satisfies β > ∆β , this divergence
also experiences unstable oscillations.
These two cases show that non-monotonic oscillations and instability occur
as soon as pollution strongly affects longevity. Therefore, environmental quality,
and its complementarity with health in longevity, is a key ingredient to explain
non-monotonic or even unstable dynamic path. However, between these two
cases, there are two additional interesting configurations.
For either values of µ and α sufficiently low, or µ sufficiently close to 1, there
exists a level of the capital-labor elasticity of substitution such that there is a
change in the stability properties (between between sink and source). Then, an
endogenous cycle occurs, through a Hopf bifurcation. This happens when the
weight of pollution in the health indicator takes intermediate values, i.e. for β
arbitrarily close to 1/Aβ .
To grab the economic intuition for the existence of these non-monotonic dy-
namic paths, the reader should recall that the dynamics are determined by (15)-
(16), taking into account that θt is given by (17). We argue that the explanation
of oscillations and endogenous cycles mainly derives from the complementarity
between health, private and public ones, and pollution in the health indicator θt.
The higher the health status, the longer the lifetime, and therefore, the larger
the saving rate (1 + θt)/(1 +α
σ
1−σ + θt), whereas deteriorated health conditions
may induce a reversal of capital accumulation, because of a lower saving rate.
Consider first that β is arbitrarily close to 0 so that the effect of pollution on
health is negligible. We can easily highlight the mechanisms at stake that induce
a positive relationship between kt and kt+1, which then implies a monotonic
dynamics and excludes any oscillations. Indeed, following a raise in physical
capital, kt, two effects arise. An income effect that triggers both private health
expenses and savings, and a longevity effect that reinforces the positive effect on
savings. Indeed, beyond the income effect, a raise in kt simultaneously drives up
the provision of public health care, which in turns improves the health indicator
and longevity. Hence, incentives to invest in private health are reduced in favor
of physical capital accumulation, because the marginal return on private health
investment is lower. Hence, a raise in kt always supports larger savings and thus
physical capital accumulation, which also explains monotonic convergence.
Assume now that β is large enough. Pollution strongly affects the health
status and there exists a complementarity between health, be it private and
public, and environmental quality. Besides, the stock of pollution Pt shapes
longevity of households born at date t, but positively depends on past stock
of physical capital kt−1. Consider now a sequence of physical capital such that
kt−1 and kt raise through time. Using (16), we deduce that of course the income
raises since kt increases, but now two opposite effects on health occur. On
the one hand, the increase of physical capital by augmenting public healthcare
provision pushes up the saving rate. On the other hand, an increase of kt−1
induces more pollution, which is harmful for the health indicator and, therefore,
for savings. Because of this last feedback effect, a sequence of growing capital
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stock may experience a reversal, which explains the existence of oscillations
in this model. Hence, in one economy where environmental factors become
crucial determinants of life expectancy relative to usual health components, the
stability of the economy is threatened. This is a serious concern to be considered
by public authorities, as in many recent reports the WHO has underlined the
growing role played by pollution in the evolution of longevity. We could even
argue that in the case where β is very large, the sustainability of the growth
process is reconsidered: It appears that pollution generates some irreversibility
to that extent that it prevents the economy from reaching the steady state but
rather generates structural instability.
Proposition 4 further shows that persistent endogenous cycles occur through
a Hopf bifurcation if either µ and α are close to 0 or µ close to 1. Indeed, in
both cases, the feedback effect of pollution is reinforced and the sensitivity of the
economy to pollution is increased. When µ is low, public spendings are mainly
devoted to pollution abatement and mechanically the provision of public health
care is drastically low. Since α is also small, private health also displays a
weak effect on the health indicator. When µ is close to 1, public expenditure
are mainly dedicated to public health. Obviously, public abatement is negligible
and the positive effect of kt−1 on the stock of pollution is well much stronger. All
together, these interactions involve endogenous cycles that might compromise
sustainability in the long term since the economy never attain the stationary
solution. This kind of result has been also highlighted by Zhang (1999), although
the sources of these fluctuations are not quite similar. Here, it is mainly due to
the apparently inappropriate public policy design, which in fact intensifies the
negative pollution externality.
6 Stabilisation versus stationary welfare
In Section 4, we have extensively discussed the effects of the public policy on
the stationary welfare. We now examine whether these results are mitigated or
not by the consequences of the same public policy on the stability properties of
the steady state.
Focusing on the most interesting configurations where endogenous cycles can
occur, i.e. cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 4, we investigate whether a variation
of the policy parameter µ is able to rule out endogenous cycles and restore
stability.
Proposition 5 Assuming that 1 < 1, 1 < (1− τ)w < 1 +α σ1−σ and Assump-
tions 1-3 hold, the following holds.
1. If µ < 1− 1s/[2τ(1− s)], α sufficiently low and β larger but arbitrarily
close to 1/Aβ, a slight increase of µ can rule out endogenous cycles, because
β becomes lower than 1/Aβ. Then, the steady state is stable for all ρ ∈
(2s,+∞).
2. If µ is close to 1 and β smaller but arbitrarily close to 1/Aβ, a slight
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decrease of µ can rule out endogenous cycles, because β becomes larger
than 1/Aβ. Then, the steady state is unstable for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞).
Proof. See Appendix J.
We have previously given sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a Hopf
bifurcation. We have also highlighted that endogenous cycles can emerge when
the share of public spending devoted to public health µ is either sufficiently low
(configuration 2 of Proposition 4) or sufficiently close to 1 (configuration 3 of
Proposition 4). This corollary shows that if initially public funds are mainly
dedicated to environmental protection (µ is low), then a slight increase of µ
may rule out these cycles; Whereas if µ is initially close to 1, a slight decrease
of µ may eliminate them. Therefore, depending on whether the share of public
spending devoted to public health care is either low or large and close to 1,
an increase or a decrease of µ is recommended to eliminate cycles. In both
configurations, the change in the policy design mitigates the feedback effects
induced by the accumulation of pollution.
However, there is a main difference between these two results. If µ is low,
a slight increase of µ induces stability. If µ is close to 1, a slight decrease of
µ creates instability for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞), whereas before, there was instability
for ρ ∈ (2s, ρH) only. This also means that starting with instability for all ρ ∈
(2s,+∞), a slight increase of µ may be a source of stability for ρ ∈ (ρH ,+∞).
Hence, even for µ sufficiently close to 1, an increase of µ can promote stability
for a non-empty range of elasticities of capital-labour substitution ρ. For a
given vulnerability of life expectancy to pollution, it seems possible to eliminate
cycles by choosing an appropriate public policy. Nevertheless, the allocation of
public funds should be cautiously used since it could be the case that it fosters
the occurrence of aggregate instability rather than promotes a stable dynamic
path. The following proposition summarizes our conclusions.
Proposition 6 Assume that 1 < 1, 1 < (1−τ)w < 1+α σ1−σ and Assumptions
1-3 hold. If β larger but arbitrarily close to 1/Aβ and either µ < 1−1s/[2τ(1−
s)] and α sufficiently low, or µ close to 1, a slight increase of µ has a stabilizing
effect by reducing the range of ρ for instability.
It is necessary to investigate the outcome of such a policy design in the light
of the analysis lead in Section 4. In particular, we wonder whether this result
is consistent or compatible with the policy recommendations established at the
steady state. Indeed, we have demonstrated (see Proposition 2) that a larger
support towards public health is welfare enhancing if µ is initially low enough.
The results we obtain in this section reinforce this suggestion, underlying that it
can also stabilize the economy. For µ sufficiently close to 1, the conclusions are
mitigated. Even if a raise of µ can bring forward economic stability - for some
values of ρ - it can also reduce the stationary welfare. Indeed, configuration
2 of Proposition 2 is more likely in this case. Therefore, the stabilizing policy
may be detrimental for welfare, while for µ rather low, it can satisfy both the
economic stability and the improvement of the stationary equilibrium.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents an overlapping generations model where longevity is en-
dogenously influenced by public health provision, pollution and private health
efforts undertaken by individuals. Public expenditure, financed thanks to labour
taxation, provide both public health and abatement. A larger support towards
public health may raise the welfare evaluated at the unique steady state, if ini-
tially the sharing rule of public fund is more favorable to pollution abatement
and/or if pollution has a negligible impact on longevity. In contrast, if initially,
the amount of public heath expenses is already large and/or if pollution is a cru-
cial determinant of longevity, increasing the effort of abatement is recommended
to improve welfare. As a warning and a recommendation for policy makers, we
show that the complementarity between pollution and health in the longevity
can also be source of aggregate economic instability: When the effect of pollu-
tion on longevity is large enough, endogenous cycles may occur and the steady
state becomes unstable. Then, we underline the possible stabilizing effect of a
fiscal receipts allocation that would increase the share of public spending de-
voted to public health. However, we mitigate our conclusions since such a fiscal
policy may deteriorate capital accumulation and welfare at the steady state, if
initial public health expenses almost cover public spending.
8 Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 1
First of all, to prove Lemma 1, we can easily show that limxt→0 θt = 0. Let
us note Γt > 0 the left-hand side of inequality (7), i.e. Γt ≡ 11+θt αxt . Then,
limxt→0 Γt = +∞. Therefore, Γt < 1−σσst cannot hold for xt = 0, which implies
that xt > 0 and Γt =
1−σ
σst
.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Any steady state should satisfy P > 0. Under Assumption 2, P = ψ(k) > 0 for
all k > 0. In contrast, P = ϕ(k) > 0 requires:
w(k)/k > 1/(1− τ) (A.1)(
α
σ
1− σ + 1
)
/(1− τ) > w(k)/k (A.2)
Since w(k)/k = f(k)/k− f ′(k), we can easily show that limk→+∞ w(k)/k =
0. From Assumption 1, there exist values of k > 0 such that w(k)/k >(
α σ1−σ + 1
)
/(1 − τ). Since d ln[w(k)/k]/d ln k = s(k)/ρ(k) − 1 < 0, we also
note that w(k)/k is decreasing. This shows the existence of k and k, defined by
(20) and (21) respectively, such that k < k. Any k ∈ (k, k] satisfies inequalities
(A.1) and (A.2).
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We show now the existence of a steady state that belongs to (k, k]. By direct
inspection of (18), we deduce that ϕ(k) = +∞ and ϕ(k) = 0. Moreover,
ψ(k) <
1
m
1f(k) < +∞
ψ(k) >
1
m
f(k)[1 − 2(1− µ)τ ] > 0
By continuity, there is at least one solution k∗ ∈ (k, k) solving ϕ(k∗) = ψ(k∗).
To show uniqueness, let us note ϕ(k) ≡ ϕ′(k)k/ϕ(k) and ψ(k) ≡ ψ′(k)k/ψ(k).
Using (18) and (19), we get:
ψ(k) =
s(k)
ρ(k)
1ρ(k)− 2(1− µ)τ(1− s(k))
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s(k)) (A.3)
ϕ(k) =
1
β
2(1− τ)w(k)s(k)/ρ(k)− [1 + α+ (1− α)s(k)/ρ(k)]k
(1− τ)w(k)− k (A.4)
− 1
β
[1 + ασ/(1− σ)]k − (1− τ)w(k)s(k)/ρ(k)
[1 + ασ/(1− σ)]k − (1− τ)w(k)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ψ(k) > 0. Moreover, the first term in (A.4) is
lower than 1/β, whereas the second one is larger than 1/β. We conclude that
ϕ(k) < 0, which shows the uniqueness of the steady state.
C Proof of Lemma 2
In the long run, the welfare W is defined by W ≡ pi(θ)c1−σ/(1 − σ). Since
consumption is given by c = R(k)k/pi(θ), the welfare may be rewritten:
W = pi(θ)σ(R(k)k)1−σ/(1− σ) (A.5)
Using (18), we have:
θ =
[(1− τ)w(k)− k]α[µτw(k)]1−α
P β
=
(
α σ1−σ + 1
)
k − (1− τ)w(k)
(1− τ)w(k)− k ≡ θ(k)
(A.6)
Substituting θ = θ(k) into (A.5), the welfare becomes a function of k, namely
W ≡ W (k). Therefore, at the steady state k∗, the welfare is given by W (k∗).
Using Assumption 1, R(k)k is increasing in k. We also know that pi(θ) is
increasing in θ. Therefore, W (k∗) is an increasing function of physical capital
if θ′(k) > 0. Using (A.6), we get:
θ′(k)k
θ(k)
=
(
α σ1−σ + 1
)
k − (1− τ)w(k) s(k)ρ(k)(
α σ1−σ + 1
)
k − (1− τ)w(k)
−
(1− τ)w(k) s(k)ρ(k) − k
(1− τ)w(k)− k > 0
because, according to Assumption 1, ρ(k) > s(k).
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D Proof of Proposition 2
Let us note ϕ(µ) ≡ ∂ϕ(k)∂µ µk and ψ(µ) ≡ ∂ψ(k)∂µ µk . The steady state k∗ is given
by ϕ(k∗) = ψ(k∗). Differentiating this equation with respect to k and µ, we get:
dk∗
dµ
µ
k∗
=
ϕ(µ)− ψ(µ)
ψ(k∗)− ϕ(k∗) (A.7)
We have ψ(k
∗) > ϕ(k∗). Therefore, the sign of dk
∗
dµ
µ
k∗ is given by ϕ(µ)−ψ(µ).
Using (18) and (19), we have:
ϕ(µ) =
1− α
β
(A.8)
ψ(µ) =
2µτw(k
∗)
1f(k∗)− 2(1− µ)τw(k∗) (A.9)
We easily deduce the necessary and sufficient conditions to have either
dk∗/dµ > 0 or dk∗/dµ < 0. We now determine sufficient conditions that do
not depend on the steady state level k∗.
One one hand, we note that ψ(µ) <
2µτf(k
∗)
[1−2(1−µ)τ ]f(k∗) =
2µτ
1−2(1−µ)τ . Using
(A.8) and (A.9), we deduce that ϕ(µ)− ψ(µ) > 0 if 1− α > β 2µτ1−2(1−µ)τ .
On the other hand, ψ(µ) >
2µτw(k
∗)
1f(k∗)
= 2µτ(1−s(k
∗))
1
> 2µτ21 under Assump-
tion 1. We deduce that ϕ(µ)− ψ(µ) < 0 if 1− α < β 2µτ21 .
Of course, using Lemma 2, we deduce the effects of µ on the stationary
welfare W ∗. We focus now on the effects induced by a change in µ on pollution
P ∗. Using (19) and (A.7), we have:
dP ∗
dµ
µ
P ∗
= ψ(k
∗)
dk
dµ
µ
k∗
+ ψ(µ)
=
ψ(k
∗)ϕ(µ)− ϕ(k∗)ψ(µ)
ψ(k∗)− ϕ(k∗)
Since ψ(k
∗) > 0, ϕ(k∗) < 0, ϕ(µ) > 0 and ψ(µ) > 0, we easily deduce that
dP∗
dµ
µ
P∗ > 0.
E Proof of Corollary 1
First note that f(k) = Aks, with A > 0 and s ∈ (0, 1/2), satisfies Assumption
1. Using this production function, we have w(k∗)/f(k∗) = 1 − s. Therefore,
using the proof of Proposition 2, ϕ(µ) > ψ(µ) if and only if:
(1− α)[1 − 2τ(1− s)] > µ2τ(1− s)[β − (1− α)]
Since µ ∈ (0, 1], this inequality is satisfied if β 6 (1−α)1/[2τ(1−s)] or β >
(1−α)1/[2τ(1−s)] and µ < µ̂. On the contrary, when β > (1−α)1/[2τ(1−s)]
and µ > µ̂, we obtain ϕ(µ) < ψ(µ). Then, the proof of Proposition 2 allows
us to deduce the corollary.
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F Proof of Proposition 3
Using (18) and (19), there exists a unique value m = m∗ solving ϕ(1) = ψ(1),
with:
m∗ = [1f(1)− 2(1− µ)τw(1)]
[
α σ1−σ + 1− (1− τ)w(1)
] 1
β
[(1− τ)w(1)− 1]α+1β [µτw(1)] 1−αβ
(A.10)
Of course, m∗ > 0, whereas
m∗ <
1f(1)
(
α σ1−σ + 1
) 1
β
[(1− τ)w(1)− 1]α+1β [µτw(1)] 1−αβ
< 1
for 1 < 1. Finally, we clarify that k
∗ = 1 belongs to (k, k) for 1 < (1−τ)w(1) <
1 + α σ1−σ .
G Proof of Lemma 3
We differentiate the dynamic system (15)-(16) around the normalized steady
state k∗ = 1. We get:
dPt+1
P ∗
= (1−m∗)dPt
P ∗
+m∗
s
ρ
ρ1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
dkt
k∗
dkt+1
k∗
= −
βθασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
dPt
P ∗
+
s
ρ
1 + (1−τ)w−(1−α)(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
dkt
k∗
where θ is given by (28). We deduce the trace T (ρ) and the determinant D(ρ)
of the associated Jacobian matrix, given by (26) and (27) respectively.
H Proof of Lemma 4
The steady state is a saddle if either P (−1) < 0 < P (1) or P (1) < 0 < P (−1).
Since T (ρ) > 0 and D(ρ) > 0, we have P (−1) = 1 + T (ρ) + D(ρ) > 0. To
determine the sign of P (1) = 1− T (ρ) +D(ρ), let us note:
Λ(ρ) ≡ s
ρ
1 + (1−τ)w−(1−α)(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
(A.11)
Because Λ(ρ) is decreasing in ρ and ρ ∈ (2s,+∞), we have Λ(ρ) < Λ(2s).
One can easily prove that Λ(2s) < 1, that shows that Λ(ρ) < 1 for all ρ ∈
(2s,+∞).
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Using (26), (27) and (A.11), we deduce that:
P (1) = m∗(1− Λ(ρ))
+ m∗
s
ρ
ρ1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
βθασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
> 0
Since P (1) > 0 and P (−1) > 0, the steady state cannot be a saddle, but is
either a source or a sink.
I Proof of Proposition 4
Let
Aβ ≡ m
∗s1
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
(A.12)
Bβ ≡ (1−m∗)Λ(2s) < 1 (A.13)
Cβ ≡ m
∗
2
2s1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
(A.14)
∆β ≡
1−m∗ − s
ρ
1 + 1−τ)w−(1−α)(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
2 ρ
4m∗s
(A.15)
1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
ρ1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
[
(1 + θ)(1 + θ + ασ/(1− σ)
θασ/(1− σ) +
α
(1− τ)w − 1
]
where m∗ given by (A.10) is a function of β.
As a preliminary remark, by direct inspection of (A.12)-(A.15), we observe
that Aβ , Bβ , Cβ and ∆β have finite and strictly positive values. In addition,
we have Bβ < 1. Using (28), we note that θ does not depend on β. On the
contrary, m∗ depends on β, but always belongs to (0, 1) (see Appendix F).
Therefore, there exist values of β such that it may be larger or smaller than
1/Aβ , (1−Bβ)/Cβ and ∆β , respectively.
Using Proposition 3, we easily prove that T 2(ρ) − 4D(ρ) < 0 if and only
if β > ∆β . In this case, the two eigenvalues are complex conjugates. On the
contrary, β < ∆β is equivalent to T
2(ρ) − 4D(ρ) > 0 and the two eigenvalues
are real.
Taking into account the results of Lemma 4, the steady state is a sink if
D(ρ) < 1 and is a source if D(ρ) > 1. Moreover, choosing ρ ∈ (2s,+∞) as a
bifurcation parameter, a Hopf bifurcation generically occurs if D(ρ) crosses 1
for a value of ρ that belongs to (2s,+∞).
By direct inspection of (27), we immediately see that D(ρ) either monoton-
ically increases or decreases with respect to ρ. We have:
D(+∞) = Aββ (A.16)
D(2s) = Cββ +Bβ (A.17)
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Both D(+∞) and D(2s) belong to (0, 1) when β is low enough. Since D(ρ)
monotonically varies with respect to ρ, the steady state is a sink for all ρ ∈
(2s,+∞). When β is sufficiently large, both D(+∞) and D(2s) are larger than
1. In this case, the steady state is a source for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞).
We now investigate whether there may be a change of stability through the
occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation when ρ describes (2s,+∞). Using (A.16) and
(A.17), D(+∞) > 1 and D(2s) < 1 if and only if:
Aββ > 1 and Cββ +Bβ < 1 (A.18)
Taking β = 1/Aβ , the second inequality rewrites Cβ/Aβ+Bβ < 1. Using (A.12)
and (A.14),
Cβ
Aβ
=
2s1 − 2(1− µ)τ(1− s)
2s1
<
1
2
(A.19)
if and only if µ < 1− 1s/[2τ(1−s)]. Moreover, using (A.11) and (A.13), Λ(2s)
tends to 1/2 when α tends to 0, which ensures Bβ < 1/2. By continuity, for α
low enough and β larger but sufficiently close to 1/Aβ , the two inequalities in
(A.18) are satisfied. Therefore, we can conclude that there exists ρH ∈ (2s,+∞)
satisfying D(ρH) = 1. Moreover, D(ρ) < 1 for ρ ∈ (2s, ρH), whereas D(ρ) > 1
for ρ ∈ (ρH ,+∞).
Finally, we have D(+∞) < 1 and D(2s) > 1 if and only if:
Aββ < 1 and Cββ +Bβ > 1 (A.20)
Taking β = 1/Aβ , the second inequality rewrites Cβ/Aβ+Bβ > 1. Using (A.19),
we see that Cβ/Aβ is close to 1 for µ close to 1. Therefore, for β smaller but
sufficiently close to 1/Aβ , the two inequalities in (A.20) are satisfied. We can
conclude that there exists ρH ∈ (2s,+∞) satisfying D(ρH) = 1. Moreover,
D(ρ) > 1 for ρ ∈ (2s, ρH), whereas D(ρ) < 1 for ρ ∈ (ρH ,+∞).
J Proof of Proposition 5
We note that substituting m∗ given by (A.10) into (A.12), Aβ can be rewritten:
Aβ =
s1f(1)(ασ/(1− σ) + 1− (1− τ)w) 1β
((1− τ)w − 1) 1+αβ (µτw) 1−αβ
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
1 + α(1−τ)w−1
θασ/(1−σ)
(1+θ)(1+θ+ασ/(1−σ))
(A.21)
which means that Aβ is decreasing in µ.
Consider first configuration 1 of the Proposition. Using the proof of Propo-
sition 4, inequalities (A.18) are satisfied, with Aββ arbitrarily close to 1. Since
Aβ is decreasing in µ, a slight increase of µ allows us to get Aββ < 1 and
Cββ+Bβ < 1, which rules out the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation and implies
that the steady state is stable for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞).
Second, consider configuration 2 of the corollary. Inequalities (A.20) are
satisfied, with Aββ arbitrarily close to 1. Since Aβ is decreasing in µ, a slight
decrease of µ allows us to get Aββ > 1 and Cββ +Bβ > 1, which rules out the
occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation and implies that the steady state is unstable
for all ρ ∈ (2s,+∞).
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